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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
through representatives of their own choosing, in the absence of Congressional
consent. Although DeVeau might be part of a growing willingness on the part
of the federal courts to permit greater state regulation of labor unions, in the
face of growing public concern over abuses. It is the due process aspect of
Bradley that is significant, if any one is, and disturbing. The Court quotes
DeVeau for the proposition that the disqualification of convicted "felons" from
representing labor unions is a "reasonable means for achieving a legitimate state
aim." s3 8 Then the Court points out that the aim of the present amendment is
the same, elimination of corruption from the waterfront, and closes its dis-
cussion of the issue. It would appear that only the question of legitimacy of
aim is considered-not reasonableness of means. The Court ignores the fact
that justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion in DeVeau, expressed concern
over the drastic nature of the means employed therein-disqualification of
ex-felons; but was able to find support for such measures in comparable federal
legislation.3 9 The disqualifications of the present statute are even more drastic,
and the argument based on comparable federal legislation does not apply, and
yet the Court of Appeals gives the matter scant attention in the opinion. One
feels that when a court deprives a class of persons of "the right to . . . work
• . . the most precious liberty that man possesses," 40 a careful elaboration of
the court's reasoning is warranted. Of course the states have wide powers to deal
with interests basic to the well being of their people, they may set standards
and requirements for entrance or practice of any field of occupation without
elaborate review procedure. However, it is quite another thing to permit the
deprivation of a man's livelihood on grounds not related to his fitness for the
occupation involved. It is'difficult to perceive how conviction for certain misde-
meanors involving moral turpitude would be indicative of a man's fitness or
lack of it, for employment as union representative. The Court leaves this
question in doubt.
Albert Dolata
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK CITY MNImum WAGE LAW-A LIm-
ITATION ON MUNICIPAL HomE RULE POLICE POWERS
In 1960 the New York State Legislature enacted a state-wide minimum
wage law covering virtually all occupations.' It required an hourly minimum
of $1.00 in 1960, $1.15 in 1962, and $1.25 in 1964. For the implementation
of the law, the act provided an Industrial Commissioner and Wage Boards em-
powered to make necessary upward adjustments. In 1962, New York City
adopted a similar law requiring minimum hourly rates of $1.25 in 1962, and
38. Instant case at 280, 189 N.E.2d at 603, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
39. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
40. Dissenting opinion of justice Douglas in Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'r, 116 F.
Supp. 683, 684 (1953).
1. N.Y. Labor Law, §§ 550-565.
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$1.50 in 1964.2 Employer-plaintiffs then brought two actions for declaratory
judgments contending that the city law was invalid and prayed for injunctions
pendente lite. Plaintiff's contention was based on the theory that the subject
matter was not within the scope of the city's power granted by the New York
Constitution and City Home Rule Law, and that the ordinance was inconsistent
with the state's minimum wage law. The New York County Supreme Court,
Special Term, denied plaintiff's motions; the Appellate Division reversed.3 In
the Court of Appeals the city argued that the local law was constitutional be-
cause other judicial precedents had allowed cities to impose greater restrictions
than state standards and that the ordinance, by extending the state's policy of
a base wage, did not prohibit anything affirmatively permitted by the state.
Held, affirmed on the opinion below, three judges dissenting. A city minimum
wage law, prohibiting wage rates provided for by state lawi was unconstitutional.
Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 998,
189 N.E.2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1963) (memorandum decision).
It is the police power which gives a state the' right to enact such social wel-
fare legislation as a minimum wage law.4 Municipalities have a similar police
power which may be defined briefly as the power to regulate persons and
property for the purpose of securing the public health, safety, welfare, comfort,
peace and prosperity.5 The permissible scope of the exercise of this municipal
police power has been extended in the past to the protection and regulation of
certain economic activities." Although the state's police power is inherent in
the concept of sovereignty, it is generally stated that municipalities do not
have any inherent police power7 but that such power is impliedly granted to
every municipal corporation by virtue of its organization as a state governmental
subdivision.8 The concept of home rule, though closely analogous to the power
of the municipality to legislate under state conferred police power, is based on
a constitutional concept. It is the right of cities to enact ordinances relating
to their affairs, property and government; 9 the state may regulate these areas
only by general laws applicable to all cities.' 0 The concept of home rule is pre-
constitutional,"' but it is defined by the New York Constitution, article IX,
2. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 903, § 1113; New York City Local Law No. 59
(1962).
3. 17 A.D.2d 327, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't 1962).
4. People ex rel. Siegel v. Weingrad, 26 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1941).
5. Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N.Y. 268, 25 N.E. 480 (1890).
6. See People v. Calvar Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Nassau County Ct. 1940), af'd,
286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E.2d 644 (1941); People v. Gerus, 69 N.Y.S.2d 283 (County Ct. 1942);
People v. Conlides, 148 Misc. 29, 265 N.Y. Supp. 765 (Broome County Ct. 1933).
7. 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 256 (1937).
8. Carollo v. Town of Smithtown, 20 Misc. 2d 435, 190 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Borough of Sayre v. Phillips, 14 Pa. 482, 24 A. 76 (1892); 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law
§ 256 (1937).
9. N.Y. City Home Rule Law § 11; 11 Op. St. Compt'r 613 (1955); N.Y. Const.
Art. IX, § 12.
10. N.Y. Const. art. IX; See generally Richland, Statutory and Practical Linsitatious
Upon New York City's Legislative Powers, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 326 (1955).
11. People ex rel. Metropolitan St. Ry. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs., 174 N.Y. 417,
67 N.E. 69 (1903).
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and by the state legislature in the Municipal Home Rule Law. In New York,
the home rule police power may be limited in the same two ways that it is
established: constitutional provision and legislative grant. The grants of this
power to home rule local governments take on two forms-general and specific
grants. A general grant is illustrated by the general welfare- clauses' 2 and the
New York City Home Rule Law section 11. It gives a broad authority to deal
with a particular subject such as local streets or the regulation of certain busi-
nesses and occupations."3 A specific grant authorizes a local ordinance on a
single subject while defining its details and mode of enforcement.14 Where an
ordinance, passed pursuant to a general grant of police power is challenged, the
test of validity is whether the ordinance is reasonable.15 An ordinance enacted
pursuant to a specific statutory grant may not be challenged for lack of au-
thority since it is deemed to have the same force as a legislative enactment.
This is similarly true where the local enactment is pursuant to a constitutional
grant of police power.' 6 Beyond the constitutional and statutory home rule
provisions conferring general and specific powers upon home rule cities, the
scope of their powers is a subject of varying judicial decision.17 Even if a city
apparently possesses both home rule and statutory authority, the city may not
have the right to exclusively deal with a seemingly internal matter. Under the
judicial doctrine of "state concern" the state legislature may pass laws regulating
a specific matter within an individual city, if it can be shown that the matter
has potential state-wide ramifications.'
8
The sources of municipal home rule authority are also their limits. Laws
adopted by a municipal legislative body must be consistent with constitutional
provisions, state statutes, and its charter.' 9 Generally, most jurisdictions,20 in-
cluding New York2 ' hold that consistency means that a local law may not
prohibit what a state has permitted or allow what the state forbids.22 Thus, a
12. See N.Y. Const. art. IX § 12.
13. See Safee v. City of Buffalo, 204 App. Div. 561, 198 N.Y. Supp. 646 (4th Dep't
1923).
14. Safee v. City of Buffalo, supra note 12; Matter of Stubbe v. Adamson, 220 N.Y.
459, 116 N.E. 372 (1917).
15. Cf. Safee v. Buffalo, 204 App. Div. 561. 198 N.Y. Supp. 646 (4th Dep't 1923);
Stubbe v. Adamson, supra note 14.
16. Matter of Mooney v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 33, 4 N.E.2d 73 (1936); See Larkin, The
Police Power 46 (Proceedings-Municipal Law Seminar, New York State Office for Local
Gov't 1963).
17. Antieu, The Powers of Municipal Corporations, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 118, 119 (1951).'
18. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929) ; Schlobohm v. Municipal Hous-
ing Authority, 188 Misc. 318, 62 N.Y.S.2d 71, rev'd on other grounds, mem., 270 App. Div.
1022, 62 N.Y.S.2d 541 (2d Dep't 1946), aff'd Mnern., 297 N.Y. 911, 79 N.E.2d 742 (1948).
See Salzman v. Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953) (city taxing .indebtedness
powers); Whalen v. Wagner, 4 N.Y.2d 575, 152 N.E.2d 54, 176 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1958) (the
means of access to and from New York City).
19. Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933); cf. Matter of Molnar v. Curtin,
273 App. Div. 322, 77 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 967, 80 N.E.2d 356
(1948); Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S. 129 (1959).
20. See generally Municipal Law-Conflict Between Ordinance and State Law, 29
Miss. L.. 232 (1958).
21. Matter of Kress & Co. v. City of New York, 283 N.Y. 55, 27 N.E.2d 431 (1940).
22. Cf. ibid.
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local ordinance is valid even though it provides a greater penalty than a similar
state law.23 But an ordinance directly conflicting with a state statute must
yield.24 Judicial pronouncements exist to the effect that a state policy cannot be
ignored by a municipality unless the statute specifically provides an ex-
emption.2 5 It is nevertheless conceded that local and state laws dealing with
the same subject matter are not necessarily incompatible because they are not
identical.26 Another limitation on local action is the judicial doctrine of "state
concern" 27 which allows the state legislature to act in areas which do not
directly affect the internal affairs of the city or the function of its officers, but
which at the same time deal with the welfare of the general public as well as
the residents of the city.28 City action under its general police power is equally
restricted once a local matter is labeled by the courts as one of "state concern."
Some of these matters are expressly reserved to the legislature by the state
constitution and municipal statute.29 A further limitation on municipal power
is the doctrine of pre-emption, by which subordinate legislation is held to be
precluded once the state has exclusively occupied the field by its own legisla-
tion.30 However, the single fact that the legislature has enacted statutes in an
area does not warrant the conclusion of pre-emption. 81 And, the fact that the
state has enacted comprehensive regulations governing an area does not prohibit
a municipality from enacting supplemental legislation.8 2 Thus even where state
minimums or maximums are created, local ordinances increasing or lowering
them have been upheld33 on the following grounds: that the minimum was
not the only applicable standard; 34 that the municipality may enact further
23. Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852); City of Brooklyn
v. Toynbee, 31 Barb. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); People v. Samsell, 248 N.Y. 157, 161 N.E.
454 (1928); People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945); 3 McQuillan, Municipal
Corporations § 924 (2d ed. rev.).
24. People ex rel. Oltarsh v. Levy, 266 N.Y. 523, 195 N.E. 182 (1935).
25. People ex rel. Elkind v. Rosenblum, 184 Misc. 916, 54 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct.
1945); aff'd inem., 299 App. Div. 559, 56 N.Y.S.2d 526 (2d Dep't 1945). But cf. Bareham
v. City of Rochester, 246 N.Y.140, 158 N.E. 51 (1927).
26. City of Hudson v. Wortman, 255 App. Div. 241, 7 N.Y.S.2d 631 (3d Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 279 N.Y. 711, 18 N.E.2d 325 (1938).
27. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929). See generally Richland,
Property, Affairs, and Government 35 (Proceedings-Municipal Law Seminar, New York
State Office for Local Gov't, 1963).
28. City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929). See
County Securities v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 15 N.E.2d 179 (1938) (taxation); Salzman v.
Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953) (indebtedness); People ex rel. Elkind v.
Rosenblum, 295 N.Y. 929, 68 N.E.2d 34 (1946) (education); Board of Supervisors v.
Water Power & Control Comm'n, 255 N.Y. 531, 175 N.E. 300 (1930) (water); Robertson v.
Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935) (health). See generally Diamond, Some
Observations on Local Government in New York State, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 27 (1958).
29. Redmond, Restrictions on Local Powers 58 (Proceedings-Municipal Law Seminar,
New York State Office for Local Gov't, 1963).
30. Tenny v. Sainsbury, 7 A.D.2d 514, 184 N.Y.S.2d 185 (4th Dep't 1959).
31. Ex parte Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926). See generally 11 Kan. L.
Rev. 182 (1962).
32. Vest v. Kansas City$ 335 Mo. 1, 194 S.W.2d 38 (1946); People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y.
42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945). But see In re Lane, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 367 P.2d 673 (1961).
33. See 29 Miss. L.J. 2J2 (1958).
34. Kansas City v. Henre, 96 Kan. 794, 153 Pac. 548 (1915).
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reasonable regulations applicable to its community;3 5 or that the legislature
intended either expressly or impliedly that extra local legislation might be
desirable.30 It should be noted that although these cases allowed increases in
certain state imposed minimums, yet in every one the scope and character of
the coverage of the ordinances was confined to the community itself and in fact
touched on matters traditionally considered as being basically local in nature.
The question of legislative intent is also significant to determine whether there
is pre-emption.37 This legislative intent to pre-empt may be difficult to ascer-
tain,38 but certain elements must be looked to: the legislative purpose (is the
statute capable of being locally supplemented or is it exclusive), the scope of
the statute, the elaborateness of enforcement machinery, and the apparent
legislative policy discerned from other statutes dealing with the same general
subject matter.39
The Court of Appeals adopted in full the opinion of the Appellate Division.
It reasoned that the New York City law was invalid because it effectively pro-
hibited payment of the state hourly minimums of $1.15 in 1962, and $1.25 in
1964.40 The ordinance did this by requiring hourly wage scale of $1.25 and
$1.50 respectively.41 Secondly, the Appellate Division held that the City Home
Rule Law section 11(4), which forbids amendment or repeal of any state labor
law by a city, denied New York City the authority to legislate in this area.
42
In the court's view a constitutional grant of police power to a chartered city
which might allow certain concurrent legislation was immaterial ;vhen the state
statute in question was meant to exclusively occupy the field.43 Finally, the
opinion stated that this statutory limitation, together with the legislative crea-
tion of broad enforcement machinery to deal with particular wage problems in
the state, including New York City, made clear the legislative intent to occupy
the field exclusively, thus barring parallel local laws.44 The Court of Appeals
dissenters reasoned basically that the city law was not contradictory to the
state law, but, rather, supplemental and therefore it did not "supercede,"
"amend," or "repeal" a state labor law as prohibited by the City Home Rule
Law. 45 Secondly, it was argued that in dealing with conditions peculiar to
New York City the ordinance was a proper exercise of the city's constitutional
35. City of Beloit v. Lamborn, 182 Kan. 280, 321 P.2d 177 (1958); Sternall v.
Strand, 76 Cal. App. 2d 432, 172 P.2d 921 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1946).
36. City of Lafayette v. Elias, 232 La. 700, 95 So. 2d 281 (1957); Western Pa. Ry.
Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 336 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616 (1951).
37. Shaw v. Norfolk, 167 Va. 346, 189 N.E. 335 (1937). See generally Antieu, The
Powers of Municipal Corporations, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 118 (1951).
38. See Antieu, supra note 37.
39. See 23 Ohio S.LJ. 557 (1962).
40. Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 17 A.D.2d 327, 329,
234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864 (1st Dep't 1962).
41. Id. at 330, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
42. Ibid.
43. Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 17 A.D.2d 327, 330,
234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864 (1st Dep't 1962).
44. Ibid.
45. Instant case at 1001, 189 N.E.2d at 624, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
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and legislative police power.46 Thirdly, the dissenters thought state-wide appli-
cation of the minimum wage law did not necessarily indicate pre-emption where
there is no express statutory prohibition against concurrent municipal legisla-
tion.47
One weakness of this decision lies in its failure to recognize the proper
economic role of a minimum wage law-to establish a base wage, not the only
wage. In the majority's view the state standards could not be altered except by
the statute's own procedures. An important distinction should have been made
between wage rates by contract. and wage rates by statute. Private efforts can
legally increase the statutory minimums without changing the statute itself.
Under this analysis a different view of the effect of the local law could have
been justified, and a different decision could have followed. Another weakness
was in the court's unwillingness to consider New York City's unique position
in the state picture-its high population density, inherently greater living
costs, and difficult welfare problems-requiring specialized treatment with a'
minimum wage law by the city under its charter powers. In this way the city
could have been sustained as having validly used its charter powers to deal with
a local problem. The court stated that the state legislature had created an
appropriate means for dealing with New York City through its statutory wage
adjustment procedures, making municipal action unnecessary. But a close read-
ing of the section in point4s does not show the means to be as explicit as the
court said. Te main weakness of the dissent was its inability to overcome the
majority's cogent argument of state pre-emption. Despite these criticisms, how-
ever, the result in the instant case seems correct. Even in the absence of a
state wage law, the city could probably not act because of the lack of either
general or specific constitutional or statutory authority which is required to
allow municipal legislation in a given area not usual for city action. Labor
policy has been historically a state concern, and the state's intention to occupy
the field may have been found in other existing state labor legislation. From
the economic viewpoint the decision appears sound, for certainly local minimum
wage laws would necessarily have serious effects on the entire state economy.
Such laws could cause intra-state movements of marginal industries to locali-
ties which had set lower minimum wage scales, possibly resulting in communal
competition. The paramount state interest in uniformity in this field seems
clear, and a judicial policy to protect it seems justified. Although the instant
decision struck down a local attempt to deal with a local problem, it does not
warrant an inference of any new state influences in purely local affairs. The
principle of home rule remains intact. This decision only elaborates on what
home rule is not by saying, in effect, that at present, municipal minimum wage
laws are not a proper function of the home rule police power. The thrust of
the case seems to be that in areas of social welfare commonly considered to be
46. Id. at 1000, 187 N.E.2d at 624, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
47. Ibid.
48. N.Y. Labor Law § 654.
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proper only for state and federal action, municipalities will be on tenuous consti-
tutional ground if they attempt to legislate without express state authorization.
It would be desirable to give the decision that limitation since local efforts to
supplement state standards in many areas of public interest may be justified,




ATTORNEY-AccOUNTANT AGREEMENT TO SPLIT FEE ENFORCEABLE PROVIDED
EACH RENDERS SERVICES ONLY IN His RESPECTIVE FIELD
In the same written contract, Neubecker, the defendant, retained Glickman,
an accountant, and Blumenberg, an attorney to represent him in a tax matter
which involved a deficiency pending before a Federal Tax Court. Each was to
receive 12 of Y of the difference between the alleged deficiency and the amount
of the settlement. There was evidence that each person was to perform services in
his respective field. The deficiency was reduced by $625,000 through their
efforts. Blumenberg, as the assignee of Glickman and in his own right sued
Neubecker on the express contract and in quantum meruit. A judgment on the
express contract was rendered for $208,354.69. On defendant's appeal, the Appel-
late Division reversed and ordered a new trial for only the attorney's quantum
meruit count because the express contract contemplated the rendition of legal
services by a layman and because the contract was a fee splitting agreement
forbidden by the Penal Law.1 Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Blumenberg, the attorney, claimed that a suit on the express contract was per-
missible and Neubecker, the taxpayer, claimed that a suit in quantum meruit
should not be permitted because the equally guilty attorney should not be
benefited from the alleged illegal joint retainer. The Court of Appeals held,
reversed, new trial ordered for both causes of action. The Court decided that a
single agreement whereby a lawyer and an accountant were to receive an equal
amount of a contingent sum as their fees was enforceable provided each was to
render services in his respective field. Blumenberg v. Neubecker, 12 N.Y.2d
456, 191 N.E.2d 269, 240 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1963).
In order to protect the general public, it is necessary that those who practice
law in New York State meet minimum qualifications. The State not only regu-
lates licensed attorneys in regard to mtters of practice and compensation, but
also those who are not licensed. One aspect of the State's policy is to prohibit
people who are not attorneys, licensed in New York, from practicing law on
another's behalf in New York Courts of record and from holding themselves
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 276.
